Clodius Agreement

3. With regard to the delivery to Germany of the remaining 135,000 tons of chromium, Numan stated that under the Clodius Agreement, Turkey was required to conclude a new agreement with Germany on the supply of war material before March 31, 1943, if Germany was ready to supply the war material desired by Turkey. The Germans had already said they were ready to do so. He said that the British had pushed him to refuse [page 760] to conclude a new agreement with Germany on the supply of war material. Such an approach would mean that Turkey would oppose its obligations under the Clodius agreement and he had informed the British that Turkey could not violate its obligations to Germany. Numan would not accept the claim that a new deal should be postponed until the Germans have delivered 18,000,000 Turkish liras of war material, defined in the Clodius agreement. He stressed, however, that in order to obtain the remaining 135,000 tons of chromium, the Germans had to supply not only war material, which is to be specified in a new agreement, but also all the war equipment defined in Annex IA of the Clodius agreement. 2. With regard to deliveries of chromium to the Germans under the Clodius Agreement, Numan stated that Turkey was required to deliver 45,000 tons of chromium to Germany by March 31, 1943, when the Germans delivered 55,000,000 Turkish liras in accordance with Annex I. If the Germans supplied only part of the product, Turkey was required to supply Germany with an equivalent proportion of the declared Turkish products, including a reasonable proportion of chromium to be supplied. Numan refused to accept the claim that there should be no shipment of chromium until the 18,000,000 pounds of Turkish war material had been supplied.

The British ambassador and I will continue to push the Turks to treat Pari Passu in 1943 and 1944 and will try to apply this formula in practice so that it is the most appropriate to hinder the supply of chromium by the Germans and to facilitate the greatest possible amount of chromium. However, I do not think that the Turks will accept an agreement that could prevent it between 31 March and 31 March. December 1943 to supply 45,000 tons of chromium to Germany if Germany complied with its obligations to Turkey. In my opinion, the only way the British [and we can make the real?] Limit chromium deliveries to Germany by putting pressure on the Turks to convince them to keep the Germans in strict compliance with their obligations and to refuse to change the agreement to the Germans if Germany is unable to meet its obligations. In this regard, it should be stressed that it is quite likely that Germany will not be handed over to Turkey and that the Turks somehow have carte blanche to approve German proposals to modify or adapt the Clodius agreement. I proposed to my British colleague that, in the further negotiations [page 762], he should endeavour to obtain precise assurances from the Turks that they would not make concessions to the Germans in the implementation of the Clodius Agreement, but that they would strictly abide by their obligations. . .

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